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Abstract 
Two-sided networks enabled by information 
technology (IT) represent an emerging type of 
platform-mediated market in the digital economy. 
Researchers have studied the associated economic and 
strategic issues from both theoretical and managerial 
perspectives; however, we have noticed inadequacy in 
the extant literature when observing some real-world 
cases that cannot be fully explained by the framework 
of two-sided networks. A more comprehensive model is 
needed to explicate the broader market structure and 
understand the underlying market dynamics. To 
achieve this aim, we propose a theoretical model of 
two-zoned networks. In extending the existing 
dimension of “side,” we add the “zone” dimension at 
a higher level to study two-zoned networks, which 
include two-sided networks as a special case. In the 
proposed model, two-zoned networks consist of two, 
two-sided networks and a core platform that serves 
both networks as their connection point at the nexus of 
two zones. Using the proposed model of two-zoned 
networks, we analyze four real-world business cases to 
demonstrate the model’s practical applications. 
Finally, strategic implications of this model, in terms 
of operational and legal ramifications, are described. 
We conclude with topics for future research. 
 
1. Introduction  
Two-sided networks (2SN), also referred to as 
“two-sided markets” (2SM), “two-sided platforms” 
(2SP) and “platform-mediated networks” (PMN), have 
been described as a new market structure that 
accelerated the pace and impact of business 
transformation for firms across many industry sectors 
[5, 14, 15]. Electric utilities, financial services, 
healthcare, media, semiconductors, software, 
technology, telecommunications, and transportation 
have all experienced transformation associated with 
this new market structure. Two-sided networks consist 
of a core platform, sponsors, and multiple groups of 
participants such as suppliers, producers, 
intermediaries, customers and complementors [1]. The 
core platform provides the infrastructure, services, and 
rules to facilitate the connection, communication, and 
transactions among network users.  
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model of 
two-zoned networks (2ZN) to extend the model of 
2SN. In each zone, there is a separate 2SN and the 
nexus of the two zones is a common, shared core 
platform that connects the two 2SN markets. The core 
platform provides both free and paid services, which 
leads to the labeling of the two zones as the free zone 
and the pay zone, respectively. Charging, however, is 
only one of many differences that distinguish the two 
zones; here free and pay zones are named solely for the 
sake of reference. We also emphasize two other 
significant differences between the zones: 1) end users 
being served can have different requirements and 
expectations between these two zones, and 2) the ways 
users interact with each other can differ in each zone. 
More important, these different mechanisms lead to 
different 2SN even while the core platform is still the 
same and can be shared. In each zone and between the 
two zones, there may exist same-side, cross-side, and 
cross-zone network effects. It is noted that the 
proposed 2ZN model differs from the freemium 
business model sometimes used for 2SN. Freemium is 
a pricing model based on versioning, and it enables 
monetizing the same user group [14]. The new 2ZN 
model can help analyze platform competition more 
accurately and in more detail, and hence can help 
platform owners make more informed decisions.  
 In addition, we propose three attributes of two-
zoned networks: 1) zone parallelism, 2) service 
diversity in the pay zone, and 3) latent payment in the 
free zone. The level of functional similarity between 
the services offered in the free zone and those in the 
pay zone is called zone parallelism. Such similarity 
may manifest in the interactions of user groups, the 
functional taxonomy of the two-sided markets in each 
zone, and direct and indirect network effects. We then 
apply our model of two-zoned networks to four 
popular platforms to demonstrate its constructs and 
applicability. In doing so, we show that the new 2ZN 
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model can extend existing conceptualizations prevalent 
in the extant literature. 
One area of direct applicability for 2ZN is in legal 
contexts. Market structure plays a central role in 
analyzing antitrust issues [10]. The 2ZN model we 
propose can enlighten legal analysis of antitrust issues 
because it advances the understanding of market 
structure with consideration of the underlying features 
and attributes of multiple zones. For instance, the tests 
for small but significant and non-transitory increases in 
price (SSNIP) and for identifying a hypothetical 
monopolist (HM) have traditionally been used to 
analyze market power for monopoly [11]. However, 
Hoppner [8] and others note that when applied to two-
sided networks, those tests need to be either re-
interpreted or modified as the cross-side indirect 
network effects are ignored but crucial to the 
assessment of market power and the conduct of a 
platform operator. With the two-sided network, 
particularly when one side charges zero prices by 
leveraging indirect network effects, the SSNIP test 
does not work well. Our 2ZN model has the potential 
to complement these existing antitrust tests by 
specifically pointing out the existence of “zone” 
beyond “side.” Katz and Sallet [9] argue that 
multisided platforms do not require a new antitrust 
law; instead, regulators should apply existing 
principles with due diligence in assessing whether a 
particular firm has substantial market power to harm 
competition before any litigation is raised. Moreover, 
“profitability must be taken at a platform level and not 
on sales to just one side of the market,” which implies 
the approaches to antitrust in platform markets need to 
extend beyond sides [13]. The proposed 2ZN model 
provides important insights into this topic. That 
importance is increasing today as governmental 
scrutiny of high-tech platforms for potential antitrust 
violations is being demanded by many stakeholders.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
In the next section, we review the extant literature of 
platform-mediated networks and network effects. We 
then elaborate the model of two-zoned networks. After 
that, we provide illustrative examples of two-zoned 
network markets and explicate how they differ from 
traditional two-sided network markets. We identify 
three essential attributes of two-zoned networks to re-
examine these examples in Section 5. Finally, research 
and practical implications are discussed before we 
conclude the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
Platform-mediated networks have emerged as a 
prominent market structure, and there is a rich body of 
literature on this topic (e.g., [6]). Our literature review 
is not meant to be exhaustive but focused on the 
traditional framework of two-sided markets that 
Eisenmann [5] develops. The notion of platforms was 
initially introduced as “two-sided markets” [5, 16], 
which consist of platform provider, platform sponsor, 
component suppliers, and two or more groups of users. 
As shown in Figure 1, the core of the network is an 
intermediary platform that connects two distinct groups 
of users and facilitates their interactions for product 
and service exchanges. Transactions in a two-sided 
network entail a triangular set of relationships. The 
interactions between the two distinct user groups are 
subject to the cross-side (indirect) network effects.  
Platforms need to address several critical issues in 
order to prevail in the fierce competition of two-sided 
network markets [5]. Several studies have focused on 
how to attract multiple sides to a platform [7]. In the 
process, pricing is one of the most important issues in 
platform development [3]. Because of the distinctive 
structure of 2SN, pricing on such platforms is 
complicated. One essential decision is made in regards 
which side to subsidize and which side to charge [2]. 
The prerequisite for subsidization is that the platform 
can exploit and capture cross-side network effects. 
Essentially, a platform should subsidize the side that is 
more price-sensitive and charge the side that highly 
values cross-side interactions [14]. When making the 
pricing decision, a platform owner should consider 
other factors, such as output costs, same-side network 
effects, and brand value.  
The literature of two-sided network markets is rich. 
However, we observe a gap in the literature because 
some business cases cannot be fully explained by the 
2SN framework, particularly those where the free 
service part and pay service part involve different 
interaction mechanisms. Besides, several recent works 
also point out the necessity for more complex models 
[4, 12]. Significant insights can be derived from 
analyzing group interactions, network effects, and 
mechanisms within different zones. We extend the 
existing research by creating a model of two-zoned 
networks to analyze these new features. 
 
Side 1
Platform
Side 2
Demand Side Supply Side
Components Rules Ecosystem
Platform Provider & Platform Sponsor
 
Figure 1. Traditional Framework of Two-sided 
Markets ([4]) 
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3. Model of Two-Zoned Networks 
In two-sided networks, the platform plays one role, 
the mechanism between the platform and different user 
groups remains stable, and the strategies a platform 
adopts are relatively straightforward [5]. However, it is 
our observation that some real-world platforms have 
structures that are more complex. By analyzing their 
characteristics, we identify a need to extend two-sided 
networks (2SN) to two-zoned networks (2ZN). 
The kernel of the traditional 2SN market is the 
mechanism through which the platform connects two 
distinct user groups. In other words, one single 
mechanism facilitates the interaction of users. From a 
user perspective, we refer to the usage of this 
mechanism as the “function” of the platform [5]. The 
2SN framework indicates four categories of such 
functional use: connectivity, price-setting, variety, and 
matching. For example, eBay is a price-setting 2SN 
platform for online auctions that helps buyers with 
needs and sellers with offerings to find each other and 
decide transaction prices through bidding. On the other 
hand, Facebook, which derives 85% of its revenues 
from advertising, is a variety platform of social media. 
It attracts one side (viewers) that is subsidized by the 
other side (advertisers). Since the social network 
platform is subject to strong network effects, once the 
virtuous cycle was triggered, Facebook soon took a 
lion’s share of the social media market.  
While the framework of two-sided networks is 
useful, we observe some cases that cannot be fully 
explained by this model. Boingo, YouTube, LinkedIn, 
and GitHub all provide both free accounts and 
premium pay accounts, and it is the distinction between 
free accounts and pay accounts - as well as the 
differences in their functions - from which we derive 
our two-zoned network model. LinkedIn’s premium 
account users use the platform primarily for recruiting 
and job-hunting purposes (i.e., matching), while free 
account holders use it mainly as an online social 
platform to network with other professionals (i.e., 
connectivity) and share content (i.e., variety). For free 
and paid users, the LinkedIn platform provides 
different value and facilitates the interaction of users 
within and between distinct groups through different 
mechanisms. As a result, we find it necessary to extend 
and enhance the traditional framework of two-sided 
networks. Specifically, we find that whether the 
provided service is free or not can be a deciding factor 
for differentiating these platforms from traditional 
ones. The reason is that the core platform mechanism 
fulfills different functions by providing different 
services for free vs. premium account users. Hence, the 
value creation strategies are different. Technically, we 
extend the traditional framework by adding the “zone” 
dimension at a higher level of abstraction above the 
“side” dimension. In each zone, customers use the 
platform and its provided services differently.  
Figure 2 shows our proposed model of a two-zoned 
network. We define a two-zoned network as a 
platform-mediated network that encompasses both a 
free zone and a pay zone, each of which consists of a 
two-sided network. At the nexus of the two zones, the 
core platform serves as an intermediary that connects 
multiple groups of users. The core platform may play a 
different role in each zone by performing a different 
function. Following Eisenmann’s [5] definitions for a 
two-sided network, platform sponsors are also called 
platform owners. Owners decide the rules, policies and 
standards for the platform. They can modify the 
platform’s infrastructure technology and decide who 
can participate in the network and in which role. 
Platform providers connect distinct groups of users and 
mediate their interactions. They are the primary point 
of contact for users if there are any problems with 
using the platform. Platform component suppliers 
provide users with additional goods and services called 
platform components that are not directly available 
from platform providers. These complementary 
components can enhance user experience in using the 
platform. Demand-side users are also called end users. 
In the free zone, end users are not monetarily charged 
for using the platform. The services the platform 
provides fall under the “attraction” part. The goal of 
the free zone is to build a large user base quickly. In 
the pay zone, signing up for extended services requires 
users’ monetary payments and thus relates to the 
“extraction” part. Users often face the same-side 
(direct) and cross-side (indirect) network effects. 
From the perspective of platform providers, they 
may enjoy demand-side economies of scale, owing to 
positive network effects. Oftentimes, the user base that 
the platform has accumulated in the free zone can be 
harvested and monetized. Supply-side users, on the 
other hand, offer content as complements that are 
delivered through the core platform to be enjoyed by 
demand-side users. These content providers have 
interactions with demand-side users in each 
corresponding zone. In the “attraction” (free) zone, the 
goal is to grow the user base and hence the 
infrastructures and mechanisms are designed to quickly 
achieve a critical mass level necessary for the ignition 
of network effects. In the “extraction” (pay) zone, the 
goal instead is to generate profits, and the platform 
offers services to achieve this aim.  
It is noted that a user group’s role in one zone does 
not necessarily translate into the same role in the other 
zone. Advertisers, for example, may interact with users 
in the free zone as a platform requires free users to 
watch a short video commercial before they are 
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allowed to use the free services (e.g., Wi-Fi or access 
to the requested content). However, once users sign up 
for a premium pay account, they would be excused 
from advertising. In Figure 2, the arc arrows in 
different colors indicate network effects, including red 
for the same-side (direct) network effects and green for 
the cross-side (indirect) network effects. The yellow 
straight arrow stands for communication between free 
users and paid users across zones and thus represents 
possible cross-zone network effects that are not 
examined in the 2SN literature. In each zone, the 
platform connects two (or more) user groups. 
Platform
Side C
(e.g., Advertisers)
Side B
(e.g., Paid users)
Side D
(e.g., Content 
provider)
Side A
(e.g., Free users)
Free Zone
Pay Zone
 
 
Demand side user group
Supply side user group
Cross side network effects
Same side network effects
Connection between 
platform and user group
Communication/ Cross Zone 
Network Effects (CZNE)
Legend:
 
Figure 2. Model of Two-zoned Networks 
  
Using structural taxonomy, Eisenmann [5] 
classifies two-sided networks into four functional 
categories: connectivity, variety, matching, and price-
setting. Therefore, the two-sided network in each zone 
of Figure 2 can belong to one such category. If the two 
2SNs in both zones belong to the same functional 
category, this similarity is called “zone parallelism.” In 
other words, the two-zoned network is said to have 
high zone parallelism if both of the two-sided markets 
perform the same function. On the other hand, the two-
zoned network shows low zone parallelism if the core 
platform plays a different role in each zone. In this 
case, the two 2SNs perform different functions in each 
zone, and the network effects within and between user 
groups in each zone may be quite different.  
In the free zone, the platform may require users to 
make a latent payment, such as watching a short video 
commercial or revealing personal data (e.g., email 
address or physical location) prior to being allowed to 
use the free services. Whether users in the free zone 
have to make such a latent payment is another attribute 
of a two-zoned network that differentiates the new 
2ZN model from the 2SN model. The latent payment is 
an embodiment of opportunity cost borne by free users, 
and if it exists, the no-cost services they access are not 
truly free. Nonetheless, the services offered in the free 
zone still fall under the “attraction” set.  
On the other hand, in the pay zone, users are 
charged a fee to use additional services provided by the 
platform. Sometimes the paid services are an extended 
version of the basic free services but with a larger 
capacity and/or for a longer period of time. At other 
times, the platform offers completely new services 
because the targeted customers in the pay zone have 
different utility requirements from those in the free 
zone. In either case, these services belong to the 
“extraction” set. As a result, two-zoned networks may 
also vary in the diversity of services offered in the pay 
zone. Here we emphasize that zone parallelism is 
different from service diversity. Service diversity is a 
characteristic of the pay zone, while zone parallelism is 
an outcome characteristic based on direct comparison 
of the free zone and the pay zone. Oftentimes, the more 
diverse the pay zone is, the less similar the two zones 
are. However, at other times, service diversity can be 
low when zone parallelism is also low for a two-zoned 
network. In this situation, the services the platform 
offers in the pay zone perform the same function, but 
they still differ from those offered in the free zone. If 
service diversity is high, it means that the platform 
performs different functions, which in turn requires 
more complex coding efforts and advanced 
programmer IT skill sets. If service diversity is low, the 
platform can adopt the same infrastructure for the same 
functions. In this light, the implications of 2ZN for 
technical complexity and development cost are 
consistent with the logic of service computing.  
In conclusion, the three factors – zone parallelism, 
latent payment in the free zone, and diversity of paid 
services in the pay zone – are identified as a triad of 
essential attributes in analyzing a two-zoned network. 
These factors make the new 2ZN model related to, but 
also distinct from, the 2SN model. With the additional 
level of “zone,” we distinguish the free and paid 
services into two zones and separately analyze their 
underlying mechanisms. Different mechanisms can 
lead to different pricing strategies, budget planning, 
infrastructures, and IT investment requirements. This 
new model of two-zoned network can help platform 
owners better understand the mechanisms and make 
more informed decisions accordingly. In addition, 
these different mechanisms can be leveraged to more 
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transparently demonstrate when there may be overt 
antitrust/monopolistic activities. In the next section, we 
apply the new model of two-zoned network to four 
real-world cases for comparison, and we analyze how 
they vary along dimensions based on the three factors. 
4. Practical Applications of the Two-zoned 
Network 
In this section, we discuss four specific platforms 
and apply our 2ZN approach to each for analysis. The 
first one is Boingo, a U.S.-based company that 
provides mobile Internet access for wireless-enabled 
consumer devices. We divide the Boingo platform into 
the free zone and the pay zone, as shown in Figure 3. 
Boingo customers do not interact with each other 
directly, as their primary goal is to access the Internet 
via Boingo’s Wi-Fi services. Instead, their interactions 
on the platform are with the other group: advertisers in 
the free zone and the Internet service providers at the 
locations in the pay zone. 
The core platform plays different roles in each of 
the two zones, where the two types of users are 
separated and served differently. Users in the free zone 
are required to watch advertising videos before being 
able to access free Wi-Fi for a limited period. Thus, in 
the free zone, Boingo generates revenues from the 
advertisers who, in essence, subsidize the free users. 
Boingo’s Wi-Fi service falls into the “attraction” part 
of the service computing paradigm. There is a positive 
cross-side network effect from free users to advertisers: 
the more users it has, the more willing advertisers are 
to run their ads on the Boingo platform. In the free 
zone, advertisers are on the monetized side and the 
users are on the subsidized side. Customers in the free 
zone make latent payments via the time they spend 
watching the commercials. In this light, insights from 
using the 2ZN model can be generated into any 
scenario that Boingo may face with regard to pricing 
competition, tipping strategies, antitrust concern, etc.  
In the pay zone, users pay a monthly subscription 
fee for a Wi-Fi plan and therefore do not need to watch 
any commercials. Boingo offers different Wi-Fi plans 
with varying numbers of devices allowed, and there 
may be different prices for different locations. The 
number and diversity of locations are the main factors 
that paid users consider when deciding whether to 
purchase Boingo’s Wi-Fi services. In order to make its 
services attractive, the company must maintain a 
sufficient number of hotspots in diverse locations. 
Thus, in the pay zone, the Boingo platform is a variety 
network for paid users. The paid services are simply 
upgraded versions of the basic free service. Other 
enhanced plans involve different locations, different 
device limits, and different time limits. The locations 
that offer Boingo Wi-Fi also have to pay Boingo to 
install and maintain the Wi-Fi infrastructure, which 
provides Boingo with another source of revenue. 
Pay zone
Free zone
Boingo
Paid users
Free users
Locations
Advertisers
Cross Zone 
promotions
Variety
Matching  
Figure 3. Two-zoned Network of the Boingo 
Platform 
The second example is YouTube, which is a 
platform that connects users, content providers, and 
advertisers. We divide the YouTube network into two 
zones, as shown in Figure 4. Both free and paid users 
care about the quality and diversity of the content 
available on the platform. The main goal of YouTube 
users is to have access to as many interesting videos as 
possible, so the platform’s function is to provide 
variety in both free and pay zones. Users also have 
cross-zone communications, as both free and paid 
users can communicate with and influence each other 
through comments, likes, dislikes, and subscriptions. In 
both free and pay zones, there are positive cross-side 
network effects between users and content providers. 
The more content providers who upload videos, the 
more users who want to access this platform. A larger 
user base also encourages more content providers to 
release videos on the platform. Within each group, 
users can communicate with each other about the 
content they watch, and content providers compete 
with one another for viewers and subscribers. One 
advantage of the 2ZN model is that it can handle more 
sophistication with the incorporation of zone. This 
additional dimension may be especially useful when 
analyzing market power and antitrust implications. It is 
noted that YouTube was acquired by Google in 2006. 
At that time, it was Google’s second-largest 
acquisition. With numerous acquisitions like YouTube, 
Google has been the subject of the investigation by the 
Federal Trade Commission. Considerable debates 
among scholars and industry experts continue 
regarding the concern that the company is becoming a 
monopoly. Both government regulators and company 
executives can use the 2ZN model to further analyze 
acquisition cases like YouTube and make more 
convincing arguments. 
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Next we analyze GitHub, which is a Web-based 
“git” repository hosting service platform that connects 
individual users working on projects. The free and pay 
zones of the GitHub network are depicted in Figure 5. 
Individual users have many opportunities to learn from 
and communicate with other experienced users about 
programming and other IT skills. Two different plans 
for GitHub users exist: the personal plan and the 
organization plan. The personal plan is for individuals 
looking to share their own projects and collaborate 
with others, while the organization plan is for 
businesses to manage teams using varying permission 
levels. In both plans, there are different subscription 
versions. Various charges not only provide users with 
different levels of public repositories but also create 
private repositories. Private repositories have limited 
visibility that is available only to their owners and 
collaborators, while public repositories are viewable to 
anyone. The number of private repositories allowed is 
determined by specific paid plans, which also offer 
different levels of additional services. The function of 
the GitHub platform is to provide connectivity and 
variety to both free and paid users in terms of 
communicating with others and learning from many 
different projects. 
The 2ZN model sheds light on the dynamics of 
GitHub and can help the company self-analyze their 
exposure to antitrust. Microsoft has recently announced 
a plan to acquire GitHub. However, if the European 
Union (EU) Competition Agency raises serious 
concerns about the acquisition, it can launch a full-
scale investigation to impede or delay the progress. 
The 2ZN model provides new legal angles, and it 
increases the transparency of important issues that need 
to be considered in the acquisition process by both 
regulators and the stakeholder companies. 
Pay zone
Free zone
YouTube
Paid users
Free users
Content 
providers
Advertisers
Content 
providers
Cross Zone 
communication
Cross Zone 
Promotions
 
Figure 4. Two-zoned Network of the YouTube 
Platform 
 
Finally, LinkedIn represents the most complex case 
among the four platforms for our analysis. As shown in 
Figure 6, both free and pay zones exist on the LinkedIn 
platform. In the free zone, people use LinkedIn as a 
professional social networking site. They develop and 
update their profiles to connect with other users. From 
this perspective, LinkedIn is similar to Facebook but 
more professionally oriented. Helping users maintain 
and grow their professional networks is the LinkedIn 
platform’s primary function, which is used mainly by 
people who are not necessarily seeking jobs. Users 
update their CVs, connect with others in their fields 
and in working groups, become acquainted with key 
players, and develop their own reputations. In this 
light, the basic function of the platform is connectivity. 
There are also forum sections on LinkedIn. Users can 
follow the blogs of other users, content providers, 
established companies, and their friends to learn about 
current trends in an industry and gain insights on the 
future of a sector. In this role, LinkedIn is similar to 
Twitter, but the content posted is more business-
focused and professionally targeted. 
Pay zone
Free zone
Github
 Individual Paid 
users
 Individual Free
users
 Organization Paid 
users
Cross Zone 
communication
Cross zone 
promotion
 Organization Free 
users
 
Figure 5. Two-zoned Network of the GitHub 
Platform 
 
 
 
Pay zone
Free zone
Linkedin
Paid users:
Job seeker, 
Businessman
Free users
Big company
Talent seeker
Recruiter
Content 
providers
Cross Zone 
communication
Cross Zone 
Promotions
Marketers and 
Advertisers
 
 
Figure 6. Two-zoned Network of the LinkedIn 
Platform 
 
In the free zone, the basic social network functions 
of the website are sufficient for most users who access 
LinkedIn for networking and content consumption, but 
insufficient for other more specific tasks such as talent 
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searches, sales opportunities, or job hunting. In other 
words, the basic services are not comprehensive 
enough for paid customers in the pay zone to carry out 
such tasks and achieve their goals. Paid users leverage 
LinkedIn to perform other additional tasks that are 
much more varied in scope. These premium 
subscriptions by individuals accounted for 20% of 
company revenues in 2011. There are four different 
LinkedIn premium accounts for individuals: Job 
Seekers, Business Plus, Sales Navigator Professional, 
and Recruiter Lite. These target potential employees, 
businesses, salespeople, and recruiters, respectively. 
Additional functions and features are provided with 
these four premium accounts.  
Apparently, users in the pay zone differ from users 
in the free zone as each group uses different functions 
and features of the platform. Job seekers and recruiters 
look for each other through LinkedIn’s matching 
function, which helps a job seeker identify companies 
that are looking for certain expertise and skills. 
Businesses looking for sales opportunities can also 
search for potential interested buyers. In addition, 
premium account users enjoy higher quality services 
than free users. When a user performs a search, for 
example, profiles of premium members appear on the 
first page of the results. With regard to technical 
support, premium users receive a faster response than 
those who do not pay. In other words, LinkedIn 
provides paid users with better services. In contrast, 
users in the free zone access the platform mainly to 
connect with others and view a variety of available 
content. Finally, because of the differences in 
mechanisms between the pay zone and the free zone, 
network effects are also shown to manifest differently. 
As for the main functions of the two-sided networks 
in the two zones, they are quite different and hence 
LinkedIn exhibits a low level of zone parallelism. In 
the free zone, LinkedIn serves as a social networking 
platform for the purpose of connectivity and variety. 
For most free users, LinkedIn is used to connect with 
other professionals in order to build and grow their 
social networks. For content providers and viewers, the 
function of LinkedIn is to provide a rich variety of 
content. In the pay zone, for salespeople and business 
customers as well as for job hunters and recruiters, 
LinkedIn functions as a matching platform that assists 
members of two distinct groups with heterogeneous 
needs in seeking out each other for business 
transactions or employment opportunities. 
LinkedIn was acquired by Microsoft in December 
2016. Just like the case of Microsoft attempting to 
acquire Github, both companies could analyze their 
own market power and potential antitrust arguments 
using the proposed 2ZN model. There are multiple 
sides, which involve several distinct groups and 
indirect network effects. At a higher level, there are 
two zones that lead to cross-zone network effects. The 
traditional monopoly tests (e.g., SSNIP/HM) only 
consider one service in a user group and may be 
insufficient for the cases like LinkedIn.  The 2ZN 
model provides constructs for new types of monopoly 
tests for these complex platforms.  For example, an app 
store that provides music, video and podcasts might be 
monopolistic if it is deemed that 2ZN attributes are 
leveraged to eliminate competition.  Separating music, 
podcasts and videos into three distinct 2SNs 
exemplifies a platform owner’s decision to mitigate the 
risk of regulatory antitrust action. 
 
5. Attributes of Two-Zoned Networks 
 
In this section, we discuss the use of three attributes 
to help differentiate two-zoned networks. The first 
attribute, zone parallelism, assesses the functional 
similarity between the two zones. Focusing on the pay 
zone, the second attribute, service diversity, examines 
the variety in both extent and types of paid services 
provided in the pay zone. The third attribute, latent 
payment, looks at whether the free services provided in 
the free zone are truly free, or whether they incur any 
opportunity costs to the free users. 
5.1. Zone parallelism 
We define zone parallelism as the extent of 
functional similarity between the two zones in a two-
zoned network. In Eisenmann’s [5] model of two-sided 
markets, platforms can be categorized into 
connectivity, variety, matching, or price setting, based 
on their functions. The level of zone parallelism varies 
across the four two-zoned networks that are discussed 
in the previous section. Figure 7 shows where they 
belong along this dimension of zone parallelism. 
YouTube has the highest zone parallelism because the 
platform performs the same function of providing 
variety in both the free zone and the pay zone. On the 
other hand, LinkedIn exhibits the lowest zone 
parallelism, as the platform provides connectivity and 
variety in the free zone while it matches job seekers 
and recruiters as well as sales people and businesses in 
the pay zone. Finally, GitHub and Boingo are situated 
in the middle of the spectrum. Zone parallelism has 
significant implications for the platform ecosystem. 
For instance, it can help platform owner decide how to 
balance the investments and resources between the two 
zones. It can also guide platform designer toward a 
better design plan for the infrastructure.  In addition, in 
circumstances where zone parallelism is purposefully 
manipulated in order to maintain a monopolistic 
competitive position, legal implications become more 
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transparent and actionable by examining the platform 
through this attribute. 
Zone parallelism
Low High
YouTubeLinkedini i GithubiBoingoi
Variety 
Variety
Connectivity & 
Variety 
Variety  Matching
Connectivity & 
Variety 
MatchingConnectivity & 
Variety
Pay               Zone
Free               Zone
 
Figure 7. Zone Parallelism of Two-zoned Networks 
 
5.2. Service diversity for paid users 
 In the pay zone, the platform provides different 
levels and/or varieties of services for paid users, and 
these diverse services are reflected in different prices. 
These paid services are either extended or upgraded 
versions of the basic services, and the main goal is to 
“extract” profits from the user base that already exists. 
We consider two aspects in describing various paid 
services. One is the extent to which the paid services 
are an enhanced version of the basic free services (i.e., 
whether the platform essentially provides the same 
services, albeit with differing quality, length, or 
number of devices and locations). This extent aspect of 
attribute has implications for the design and investment 
in the infrastructure. According to tenets of service 
computing, the infrastructure design should be 
consistent with the “service” elements. Boingo, for 
example, provides different lengths of service time, 
and the service extent also differs in the number of 
devices that customers can use to connect to Boingo 
Wi-Fi. Some plans allow up to two mobile devices, 
some allow any two Wi-Fi devices, and others allow 
any four Wi-Fi devices. While the prices reflect the 
different extents of services, the nature of such services 
remains the same.  
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Figure 8. Diversity of Services for Paid Users in 
Two-zoned Networks 
 
The second aspect we consider for service diversity 
reflects the variety in the added services provided in 
the pay zone. Some two-zoned networks offer 
additional paid services that target different market 
segments. One representative case is LinkedIn, which 
provides four different plans for paid users. The ‘Job 
Seekers’ plan targets users who wish to look for 
employment opportunities through LinkedIn, so this 
plan has features that help a user stand out from other 
job seekers to hiring managers. The ‘Business Plus’ 
plan is aimed at customers who desire to promote and 
grow their businesses. Therefore, this plan has features 
that help users maximize the reach of their networks. 
The ‘Sales Navigator Professional’ plan targets people 
who intend to seek sales opportunities. Finally, the 
‘Recruiter Lite’ plan is intended for those who wish to 
quickly identify qualified candidates suitable for their 
open positions. This plan provides such functions as 
automatic candidate tracking, recruiting-specific 
design, and integrated hiring. In a decision on the 
merger of Microsoft and LinkedIn, a service diversity 
issue was raised in the EU regarding the nature of the 
data that LinkedIn had amassed and how that data 
might be leveraged to deliver, for example, additional, 
anti-competitive Microsoft services. The EU decided 
that the data-enabled services would not create antitrust 
issues because a large amount of Internet data is 
readily available for competitors to leverage in the 
creation of a diverse set of potentially competing 
services. 
As shown in Figure 8, LinkedIn has the highest 
diversity because the platform offers the greatest 
number of paid service types, each with a different 
function, as described above. On the other hand, 
YouTube shows the lowest diversity, as the platform 
provides only one paid service (YouTube Red), which 
is essentially the enhanced version of the free service 
without commercials. Finally, Boingo and GitHub 
show moderate levels of diversity in the pay zone.   
Service diversity highlights the fact that different 
infrastructure costs can be incurred in supporting 
different levels of services across zones. These costs 
can impact technical choices where some architectural 
approaches may be deemed more desirable than the 
others. This construct may matter the most to the 
infrastructure side of the platform design. This attribute 
can also enhance the ability to bundle services that 
aims to stave off competition in conducting improper 
competitive behavior. The design of the underlying 
architecture of a platform can manifest the intent of 
platform designers as they evolve the platform for 
anticipated competition. As such, service diversity 
provides important insights to those studying platform 
market issues as well as a construct that can be 
crucially relevant in antitrust policy debates.  
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5.3. Latent payment by free users 
Like the customers in the pay zone who receive 
additional services by making direct cash payments, 
users in the free zone are sometimes required to make 
latent payments. Boingo and YouTube users, for 
example, typically are asked to watch a mandatory 
video commercial before they can access the main 
services. In such cases, customers pay indirectly with 
their time for the free services they enjoy on the 
platform. This practice of latent payment is related to 
the concept of opportunity cost in that if people want to 
consume something (e.g., Wi-Fi), they have to give up 
something else (e.g., their time). In the free zone, users 
“pay with their time” so while they do not make a 
direct cash payment, they make a latent payment. 
Therefore, the requirement that users in the free zone 
make such a latent payment is another attribute that 
distinguishes two-zoned networks.  In recent antitrust 
actions, the ability of a platform owner to manipulate 
latent payments is seen as a possible way to 
temporarily reduce customer ‘costs’ in circumstances 
where a rival digital advertising business mounts a 
challenge for a particular business segment. Using 
latent payment analysis can expose such potential 
manipulation, thereby enabling more informative 
regulatory action.  Overall, two of the four cases we 
examined above require latent payment (Boingo and 
YouTube) while the other two do not (GitHub and 
LinkedIn). 
In summary, the three attributes of zone 
parallelism, service diversity, and latent payment for 
the four two-zoned networks are shown in in Table 1. 
According to the above discussion, the four two-zoned 
networks differ across these three attributes. LinkedIn 
has a low level of zone parallelism, displays high 
diversity of additional services in the pay zone, and 
requires no latent payment of its users in the free zone. 
Boingo has a low level of zone parallelism, shows 
medium to high diversity of additional services in the 
pay zone, and requires its free-zone users to make 
latent payment. GitHub, on the other hand, has a high 
level of zone parallelism, exhibits medium to low 
diversity of additional services in the pay zone, and 
does not require its free-zone users to make latent 
payment. Finally, YouTube has the highest level of 
zone parallelism but the lowest diversity of additional 
services in the pay zone, and its users have to make 
latent payment when using the free service. These 
examples along with their respective attribute analysis 
demonstrate that the 2ZN approach is more 
comprehensive than the 2SN approach, and in our 
discussion of each 2ZN attribute, we show relevance to 
practical and highly timely legal issues being addressed 
across the globe. 
 
 
Zone 
Parallelism 
Service 
Diversity 
Latent 
Payment 
LinkedIn Low High No 
Boingo Low Medium-High Yes 
GitHub High Medium-Low No 
YouTube High Low Yes 
Table 1. Summary of the Three Attributes for the 
Four Two-zoned Networks 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model of 
two-zoned network to complement the extant literature 
of two-sided networks. We use four real-world cases to 
illustrate its applications. In the proposed model, we 
introduce a new dimension of “zone,” which extends 
the existing dimension of “side” in the two-sided 
network. The core platform provides two types of 
services: free and paid, in each corresponding zone. A 
conventional two-sided market exists in each zone. The 
core platform not only serves as a nexus of the two 
zones but also connects different user groups in each 
zone, rendering it both strategically and operationally 
important. Three specific attributes are identified to 
help illuminate the structure of two-zoned networks: 
zone parallelism, diversity of services in the pay zone, 
and latent payment in the free zone. The four cases are 
shown to exhibit noticeable differences in the three 
attributes.   
The necessity of splitting a network into two zones 
is manifested in the different values the platform 
provides to different groups of users in each zone. As 
such, varying perspectives and rules are needed to 
devise the strategy and technology development plans 
a platform should implement for each zone. In order to 
do so, platform owners should know the structure of 
their network platforms and resultant markets. Our 
two-zoned network model helps achieve this goal by 
complementing the traditional model of two-sided 
network to fill both the gap in literature and the 
deficiency in practice.  
Theoretically, our proposed model of two-zoned 
network contributes to the extant literature of 2SN. 
There are cases in which the traditional 2SN model 
does not cover every aspect of network structure. The 
three attributes that we propose also shed light on this 
new type of platform-mediated networks. Practically, 
our study helps platform owners better understand the 
ecosystem of their two-zoned networks. Competition 
today is much more dynamic and volatile, and a single 
strategic mistake can doom a platform’s future. Getting 
a clearer picture of its market structure and a better 
understanding of its interaction mechanism is thus 
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crucial. The issues of pricing decisions, the degree of 
openness, actions to cope with the “winner-take-all” 
outcome, and ways to avoid envelopment threat should 
all be considered when using the new 2ZN model to 
devise competitive strategy.  
The 2ZN model also provides new perspectives and 
insights to the legal issue of antitrust. The traditional 
tools (e.g., SSNIP/HM tests) for measuring the market 
power of a platform need to be modified and enhanced 
to consider the existence of additional zones beyond 
just sides. The ability to exercise market power on one 
zone of a platform very likely depends on the structure 
of the other zone. For instance, in the presence of 
rarely studied cross-zone network effects, users in one 
zone of the platform can be viewed as inputs to the 
supply of services for users in the other zone. Even if 
the concentration of power in one zone of the market is 
not strong enough to enable a dominant position in that 
zone, it may still be relevant as it can firstly increase 
the platform’s negotiating power and then increase 
prices in the other zone where a company can take 
advantage of its existing market power. In this light, 
zone parallelism can be especially useful in identifying 
ways to complement SSNIP/HM tests. Both plaintiffs 
and defendants in such antitrust cases of platform 
competition should consider the user groups and 
services for each side in each zone in order to make 
solid inferential justifications.  
Interesting questions for future research on the 
topic of two-zoned network can be identified. Firstly, if 
archival data about the cases examined in the paper 
become available, one can investigate relevant issues 
using econometric models to validate the empirical 
applicability of the two-zoned network. Secondly, an 
analytical study can be conducted to model the 
behaviors of different agents, such as owners, 
providers and users, in the two-zoned network. 
Thirdly, researchers are encouraged to look at other 
companies that also can be examined using this new 
2ZN model to compare findings and derive new 
implications. Other related issues include: whether 
providing free and premium account services will 
create more value for the platform; whether the 
platform can use certain strategies to encourage 
communication between different zones so as to create 
cross-zone network effects; and how the service variety 
in the pay zone can influence the utility of users, 
platform provider, and platform owner. These 
representative research questions are just a few of 
many that can further enhance our understanding of 
two-zoned networks. 
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